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Abstract
Reﬁnement quantiﬁers were introduced to quantify over all reﬁnements of a model in modal logic, where a
reﬁnement is described by a simulation relation. Given the “possible worlds” interpretation of modal logic,
a reﬁnement corresponds to an agent ruling out certain possible worlds based on new information. Recent
work by van Ditmarsch, French and Pinchinat has presented an axiomatization and complexity results for
reﬁnement quantiﬁers in the general modal logic K. Here we extend these results to apply to the epistemic
and doxastic settings for a single agent.
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1 Introduction
Epistemic logic is a modal logic used to reason about the knowledge that a collection
of agents hold about the state of the world. Dynamic epistemic logic considers how
this knowledge may change in response to informative updates, such as announce-
ments or messages, which introduce new information to some of the agents.
Previous work in dynamic epistemic logic has considered extensions of epistemic
logic which allow informative updates to be modelled and reasoned about. Of
particular interest to us are logics which introduce operators for reasoning about the
results of a speciﬁc informative update, or operators for quantifying over arbitrary
informative updates.
Several representations of informative updates have been considered for such
logics. Public announcements are a simple, restrictive representation of informative
update; a public announcement is simply an epistemic formula which is publicly
announced to all agents in the system. Action models are more complex represen-
tations of informative updates, capable of representing informative updates in which
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information is given privately to only a subset of agents in the system, something
which is not possible with a public announcement. Action models are capable of
expressing any public announcement.
Public announcement logic, introduced by Plaza [10], and also independently by
Gerbrandy and Groenvald [8], extends epistemic logic with an operator for reasoning
about the result of a speciﬁc public announcement. A similar logic for action models
was introduced by Baltag and Moss [3].
Balbiani et al. [2] then explored arbitrary public announcement logic, an exten-
sion of public announcement logic which provides an operator for quantifying over
arbitrary public announcements. van Ditmarsch and French [5] later proved that
arbitrary public announcement logic was undecidable in the multi-agent setting,
and so similar logics for action models may also be undecidable.
van Ditmarsch and French then went on to introduce future event logic [6], an ex-
tension of modal logic which introduces an operator for quantifying over reﬁnements
of models. The ﬁnite reﬁnements of a model are equivalent to the models which
result from the execution of arbitrary action models. van Ditmarsch, French, and
Pinchinat [7] later showed that future event logic is decidable with the underlying
modal axioms of K(1).
The present work extends future event logic to the setting for which it was
originally intended: epistemic logic. We examine both epistemic logic and doxastic
logic, provide an axiomatisation of the single-agent form of both logics, and an
algorithm providing an upper-bound for the complexity of satisﬁability in both
logics.
2 Technical preliminaries
We recall the deﬁnitions given by van Ditmarsch, French, and Pinchinat [7] in de-
scribing the future event logic, and adapt those deﬁnitions to be based on epistemic
logic, LS5, and doxastic logic, LKD45. Speciﬁcally, we restrict the Kripke models
under discussion to those in the class of S5 models when we are discussing the
extension of the future event logic to LS5, and to those in the class of KD45 models
when we are discussing the extension to LKD45.
Let A be a non-empty, ﬁnite set of agents, and let P be a non-empty, countable
set of propositional atoms.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [Kripke model] A Kripke model M = (S,R, V ) consists of a domain
S, which is a set of states (or worlds), accessibility R : A → P(S×S), and a valuation
V : P → P(S). The class of all Kripke models is called K . We write M ∈ K to
denote that M is a Kripke model.
For R(a) we write Ra. Given two states s, s
′ ∈ S, we write Ra(s, s′) to denote
that (s, s′) ∈ Ra. We write sRa for {t|(s, t) ∈ Ra}. As we will be required to
discuss several models at once, we will use the convention that M = (SM , RM , V M ),
N = (SN , RN , V N ), etc. For s ∈ SM we will let Ms refer to the pair (M, s), or the
pointed Kripke model M at state s.
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Deﬁnition 2.2 [Epistemic model] An epistemic model is a Kripke model M =
(S,R, V ) such that the relation Ra is an equivalence relation for all a ∈ A. The
class of all epistemic models is called S5 . We write M ∈ S5 to denote that M is an
epistemic model.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [Doxastic model] A doxastic model is a Kripke modelM = (S,R, V )
such that the relation Ra is serial, transitive, and Euclidean for all a ∈ A. The class
of all doxastic models is called KD45 . We write M ∈ KD45 to denote that M is a
doxastic model.
Throughout this paper we present results in both S5 and KD45 , often showing
a result for S5 ﬁrst and then the same result in KD45 . As such we will assume that
all models are epistemic models when discussing LS5 or LS5 , and that all models
are doxastic models when discussing LKD45 or LKD45 .
Deﬁnition 2.4 [Bisimulation] Let M = (S,R, V ) and M ′ = (S′, R′, V ′) be Kripke
models. A non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S′ is a bisimulation if and only if for all
s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′, with (s, s′) ∈ R, for all a ∈ A:
atoms s ∈ V (p) if and only if s′ ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ P
forth-a for all t ∈ S, if Ra(s, t), then there is a t′ ∈ S′ such that R′a(s′, t′) and
(t, t′) ∈ R
back-a for all t′ ∈ S′, if R′a(s′, t′), then there is a t ∈ S such that Ra(s, t) and
(t, t′) ∈ R.
We call Ms and M
′
s′ bisimilar, and write Ms↔M ′s′ to denote that there is a
bisimulation between Ms and M
′
s′ .
Deﬁnition 2.5 [Simulation and reﬁnement] Let M and M ′ be Kripke models. A
non-empty relation R ⊆ S × S′ is a simulation if and only if it satisﬁes atoms and
forth-a for every a ∈ A.
We call M ′s′ a simulation of Ms and we call Ms a reﬁnement of M
′
s′ . We write
M ′s′  Ms to denote this, or alternatively, Ms  M ′s′ .
A relation that satisﬁes atoms and forth-b for every b ∈ A, and satisﬁes back-b
for every b ∈ A− {a}, for some a ∈ A, is an a-simulation.
We call M ′s′ an a-simulation of Ms, and we call Ms an a-reﬁnement of M
′
s′ . We
write M ′s′ a Ms to denote this, or alternatively, Ms a M ′s′ .
We will use a-reﬁnements to deﬁne the semantics of the future event logic. The
signiﬁcance of reﬁnements is that the reﬁnements of a ﬁnite Kripke model are exactly
the models that result from the execution of an arbitrary action model [6].
Finally we give a result that will be used in the complexity results later.
Lemma 2.6 The relation a is reﬂexive, transitive and satisﬁes the Church-Rosser
property in the class of models K.
This is shown by van Ditmarsch, French and Pinchinat [7].
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3 Syntax and semantics
Here we deﬁne the syntax and semantics of the logics LS5 and LKD45 , which restrict
the logic LK , deﬁned by van Ditmarsch, French, and Pinchinat to models and
reﬁnements of models that are in S5 or KD45 respectively.
The same syntax used for LK is used for LS5 and LKD45 , and so we will deﬁne
it only once, as L. We also refer to the language of modal formulae as L, which is
L without the a operator.
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Language of L] Given a ﬁnite set of agents A and a set of propo-
sitional atoms P , the language of L is inductively deﬁned as
φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | aφ | aφ
where a ∈ A and p ∈ P .
Standard abbreviations include: ⊥ ::= p∧¬p; 
 ::= ¬⊥; φ∨ψ ::= ¬(¬φ∧¬ψ);
φ → ψ ::= ¬φ ∨ ψ; and aφ ::= ¬a¬φ. We use the abbreviation aφ ::= ¬a¬φ
for the dual of the a operator.
We also use the cover operator ∇aΓ, which is an abbreviation for a∨γ∈Γ γ ∧∧
γ∈Γaγ, where Γ is a ﬁnite set of formulae. This is the basis of our axiomatisation,
as it is for the axiomatisation of LK(1) presented by van Ditmarsch, French and
Pinchinat [7].
The semantics for LK , LS5 and LKD45 are very similar, and so we will introduce
a generalised set of semantics that can be applied to all three.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Semantics of LC ] Let C be a class of Kripke models, and let M =
(S,R, V ) be a Kripke model taken from the class C . The interpretation of φ ∈ LC
is deﬁned by induction.
Ms  p iﬀ s ∈ Vp
Ms  ¬φ iﬀ Ms  φ
Ms  φ ∧ ψ iﬀ Ms  φ and Ms  ψ
Ms  aφ iﬀ for all t ∈ S : (s, t) ∈ Ra implies Mt  φ
Ms  aφ iﬀ for all M ′s′ ∈ C : Ms a M ′s′ implies M ′s′  φ
The logics LK , LS5 and LKD45 are instances of LC . The diﬀerence between
these logics are the class of models that formulae are interpreted over. It should
be emphasised that the interpretation of the reﬁnement operator, a, varies for
each logic, as the reﬁnements considered in the interpretation of each logic must be
taken from the appropriate class of Kripke models. It is for this reason that LS5
and LKD45 are not conservative extensions of LK . For example, aa⊥ is valid
in LK , but not in LS5 or LKD45 . This is because given any pointed model in K ,
one can construct an a-reﬁnement from that model by deleting the a-edges starting
at the designated state; in this resulting a-reﬁnement, a⊥ is satisﬁed, and hence
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aa⊥ is satisﬁed in the original model. However because of the serial property
of S5 and KD45 models, a⊥ is not even satisﬁable in LS5 or LKD45 , and hence
aa⊥ is not satisﬁable as well.
Lemma 3.3 The logics LS5 and LKD45 are bisimulation invariant.
The proof for bisimulation invariance in LK , given by van Ditmarsch, French
and Pinchinat [7] applies to LS5 and LKD45 .
Following are some examples illustrating the semantics of LS5 .
Example 3.4 Consider a situation where two agents are initially uncertain about
a proposition p, where in fact p is true, represented by Figure 1. We assume that
all models are in S5 . An informative event is possible after which a knows that p
is true, but b does not know this. This is expressed by:
a(ap ∧ ¬bap)
Example 3.5 Imagine a scenario where an agent is presented with three cards face
down, and asked to identify which is the ace of spades (let’s suppose it is the left
card). An agent may receive many informative updates (e.g. “the card with the
bent corner is deﬁnitely not the ace”), but as an agent’s knowledge is only ever
based on reliable evidence, it follows that given any informative update, there is
always a further informative update after which the agent knows the location of the
ace:
left → left. (1)
This scenario is represented in Figure 2. We can also imagine a corresponding
scenario in terms of the agent’s belief rather than knowledge. That is we suppose
the axioms of LKD45 rather than LS5. Here an agent may believe that the ace is
either the centre card or the right card, despite this not being the case. Again the
agent may receive informative updates, but the formula (1) does not hold. We also
note that once an agent holds a belief, no informative update will cause the agent
to revise that belief:
(right ∨ centre) → (right ∨ centre). (2)
That is, we do not consider belief revision in the sense of [1] but rather belief







Fig. 1. The initial state where a and b are uncertain about p, with the subsequent reﬁnement
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Fig. 3. The initial setup in K , where an agent believes the ace is either the centre or right card, with an
example reﬁnement. Note that the relations are not equivalences, and so directions of relations are marked,
and we do not have reﬂexivity.
but requires that the information provided is consistent because of the requirement
that KD45 models are serial.
The axiomatisation given in this paper is only for the single-agent variant of
LS5 and LKD45 . The diﬀerences for the multi-agent variants will be mentioned
brieﬂy in the future work section. We note that in the single agent case for S5 ,
the semantic interpretation of the reﬁnement quantiﬁer  agrees with the semantic
interpretation of the arbitrary public announcement operator of Balbiani, et al. [2].
This is because in the single agent case of S5 , the reﬁnements of a model, up to
bisimulation, are formed by a restriction on the set of states of the original model;
a public announcement is similarly formed by such a restriction. However, the
resulting axiomatizations are quite diﬀerent since the axiomatization for arbitrary
public announcement operators relies heavily on public announcements, whereas we
do not require such operators.
When discussing the single-agent variants of these logics, we will use a subscript
(1) to denote the single-agent logics, e.g. LS5(1), LS5(1), and so on. We also drop the
superﬂuous subscripts denoting agents in the syntax of the logics, e.g. we write 
instead of a.
To simplify the completeness proof of our axiomatisations, we rely on the fact
that all formulae of L are equivalent to formulae in cover logic prenex normal form,
under both the semantics of LS5(1) and LKD45(1) . We deﬁne the prenex normal form
ﬁrst, then give another deﬁnition for the form using the cover operator, and then
show our equivalence result.
Deﬁnition 3.6 [Prenex normal form] A formula in prenex normal form is speciﬁed
by the following abstract syntax:
α ::= δ | α ∨ α
δ ::= π | π | π | δ ∧ δ
where π stands for a propositional formula.
Lemma 3.7 Every formula in L is equivalent to a formula in prenex normal form,
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under the semantics of LS5(1).
This is shown by Meyer and van der Hoek [9].
Lemma 3.8 Every formula in L is equivalent to a formula in prenex normal form,
under the semantics of LKD45(1) .
Proof. The proof given by Meyer and van der Hoek [9] for Lemma 3.7 applies also
to LKD45(1) .
Meyer and van der Hoek remarked that the only use of the reﬂexivity axiom of
LS5, T, in the proof, is in the form of the theorems  φ → φ, and  ¬φ →
¬φ. Therefore the proof holds for any logic which replaces T with axioms entailing
both of these properties. Both of these properties are obviously valid in LKD45(1) ,
and therefore the proof of Lemma 3.7 applies to this result. 
Deﬁnition 3.9 [Cover logic prenex normal form] A formula in cover logic prenex
normal form is speciﬁed by the following abstract syntax:
α ::= π ∧∇Γ | α ∨ α
where π is a propositional formula, and Γ is a set of propositional formulae.
Lemma 3.10 Every formula in L is equivalent to a formula in cover logic prenex
normal form, under both the semantics of LS5(1) and LKD45(1) .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that our given formula is in
prenex normal form (by Lemma 3.7 for LS5(1), or by Lemma 3.8 for LKD45(1) ).
Given a formula in prenex normal form, we consider each disjunct separately. We
can convert each term γ or γ into an equivalent term using the cover operator,
using the equivalences γ ≡ ∇{γ} and γ ≡ ∇{γ,
} Note that each resulting
term contains a cover operator applied only to a set of propositional formulae.
An inductive argument can be used to show that we can collapse the resulting
conjunction of cover operators into a single term containing one cover operator
applied to a set of propositional formulae. We use the following equivalence to
achieve this, and note that at each stage this equivalence preserves the property
that the cover operator is only applied to a set of propositional formulae.
∇Γ ∧∇Γ′ ≡ ∇({γ ∧
∨
γ′∈Γ′
γ′ | γ ∈ Γ} ∪ {γ′ ∧
∨
γ∈Γ
γ | γ′ ∈ Γ′})
Repeating this for each disjunct in our original formula leaves us with a formula
in cover logic prenex normal form. 
The cover logic prenex normal form will be used in our completeness proofs.
4 Axiomatisation
Here we present sound and complete axiomatisations of LS5(1) and LKD45(1) . As they
share common rules and axioms, we will deﬁne the axiomatisation FEL(1) contain-
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ing these rules and axioms, and then deﬁne the axiomatisations of LS5(1) and LKD45(1)
as extensions of FEL(1).
Deﬁnition 4.1 The axiomatisation FEL(1) is a substitution schema of the follow-
ing axioms:
P All tautologies of propositional logic.
K (φ → ψ) → φ → ψ
G0 (φ → ψ) → φ → ψ
G1 α ↔ α, where α is a propositional formula.
Along with the rules:
MP From  φ → ψ and  φ infer  ψ.
Nec1 From  φ infer  φ.
Nec2 From  φ infer  φ.
Deﬁnition 4.2 The axiomatisation FELK(1) is a substitution schema consisting of
the axioms and rules of FEL(1), along with the additional axiom:
GK ∇Γ ↔ ∧γ∈Γγ
Deﬁnition 4.3 The axiomatisation FELS5(1) is a substitution schema consisting of
the axioms and rules of FEL(1), along with the additional axioms:
T φ → φ
5 φ → φ
GS5 ∇Γ ↔ ∨γ∈Γ γ ∧
∧
γ∈Γγ, where Γ is a set of propositional formulae.
Deﬁnition 4.4 The axiomatisation FELKD45(1) is a substitution schema consisting
of the axioms and rules of FEL(1), along with the additional axioms:
D φ → φ
4 φ → φ
5 φ → φ
GKD45 ∇Γ ↔ ∧γ∈Γγ, where Γ is a set of propositional formulae.
We note that many of the axioms from LS5(1) and LKD45(1) are also axioms for the
logics LS5(1), LKD45(1) and LK(1).
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Lemma 4.5 The axioms FEL(1) are sound for the logics LS5(1) and LKD45(1) .
Proof. The soundness of the axioms P and K, and the rules MP and Nec1 in
LS5(1) and LKD45(1) can be shown by the same reasoning that they are sound in LS5(1)
and LKD45(1) . The soundness of the axioms G0 and G1, and the rule Nec2 can be
shown by the same reasoning used by van Ditmarsch, French, and Pinchinat [7] to
prove their soundness in LK(1). 
Lemma 4.6 The axiomatisation FELS5(1) is sound for the logic LS5(1).
Proof. Soundness of the axioms P, K, G0, and G1, and the rules MP, Nec1 and
Nec2 are shown above. Soundness of the axioms T and 5 in LS5(1) are well-known
results, and their soundness in LS5(1) follows from this. All that is to be shown is
the soundness of GS5.






Then for each γ ∈ Γ, there is some successor tγ ∈ sRM such that Mtγ  γ.
We can construct the model M ′ such that SM ′ = {s} ∪ {tγ | γ ∈ Γ}, RM ′ =
SM
′ × SM ′ and for all p ∈ P , V M ′(p) = V M (p) ∩ SM ′ . This model is clearly in S5.
By construction, for each γ ∈ Γ, there is a successor tγ ∈ sRM ′ such that
M ′tγ  γ. For each successor t ∈ sRM
′
we have that M ′t 
∨
γ∈Γ γ, as each successor
is either one of the tγ for some γ ∈ Γ, in which case M ′tγ  γ, or it is our initial
state s, in which case M ′s 
∨
γ∈Γ γ follows from our hypothesis that Ms 
∨
γ∈Γ γ.
Therefore M ′s  ∇Γ.
Furthermore we have that M ′s  Ms by the relation R = {(s, s)}∪{(tγ , tγ) | γ ∈
Γ} (atoms and forth are satisﬁed). Therefore Ms  ∇Γ.
Conversely, let Γ be a ﬁnite set of propositional formulae, and let Ms be a model
in S5 such that Ms  ∇Γ. Then there exists some model M ′s′  Ms in S5, via
some simulation R ⊆ S′ × S, such that M ′s′  ∇Γ.
From the deﬁnition of the cover operator, M ′s′  ∨γ∈Γ γ ∧∧γ∈Γγ.
As M ′ is in S5 , we know that s′ ∈ s′RM ′ , and so it follows from M ′s′  ∨γ∈Γ γ
that M ′s′ 
∨
γ∈Γ γ. As we know that (s
′, s) ∈ R, from atoms we know that Ms
and M ′s′ are equivalent for propositional formulae. As each γ ∈ Γ is propositional,
it follows that Ms 
∨
γ∈Γ γ.
Furthermore, from M ′s′ 
∧
γ∈Γγ, we know that for every γ ∈ Γ, there exists
some t′γ ∈ s′RM
′
such that M ′t′γ  γ. It then follows from forth that there exists
some tγ ∈ SM such that tγ ∈ sRM and (t′γ , tγ) ∈ R. From atoms we know that Mtγ
and M ′t′γ are equivalent for propositional formulae. As γ is propositional, it follows






Therefore GS5 is sound, and so FELS5(1) is sound for the logic LS5(1). 
Lemma 4.7 The axiomatisation FELKD45(1) is sound for the logic LKD45(1) .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for Lemma 4.6. Instead of showing sound-
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ness for the S5(1) axioms, we must show that the KD45(1) axioms are sound, and
this follows from their soundness in LKD45(1) . The main diﬀerence in the proof of
soundness is for GKD45 as compared to the proof for GS5, is that in the right to
left direction, we do not have to show that Ms 
∨
γ∈Γ γ; as doxastic models do not
have to be reﬂexive, there is no requirement for s to be in the possible worlds for the
constructed reﬁnement. For the left to right direction of the proof, the reﬁnement
M ′s′ is a KD45 model instead of an S5 model, but this has no bearing on the rest
of the proof. 
We show the completeness of the axiomatisations FELS5(1) and FEL
KD45
(1) by
provably correct translations from LS5(1) to LS5(1), and from LKD45(1) to LKD45(1) respec-
tively. Completeness then follows from the completeness of LS5(1) and LKD45(1) .
Lemma 4.8 Every formula of L(1) is provably equivalent to a formula of L(1) with
the axiomatisation FELS5(1).
Proof. Given a formula ψ we prove by induction on the number of occurrences of
 that ψ is equivalent to a -free formula, and therefore to a formula in L(1). The
base case with no  operators is trivial, as a -free formula is a formula in L. Now
assume that ψ contains n + 1 -operators. Choose a subformula of type φ of our
given formula, where φ is -free. Without loss of generality, by Lemma 3.10 we can
assume that φ is in cover logic prenex normal form. We prove by induction on the
structure of φ that φ is provably equivalent to a formula χ without the  operator.
• (φ∨ψ) iﬀ φ∨ ψ. (Derivable from P, G0, and G1, and the induction hypoth-
esis.)
• (π∧∇Γ) iﬀ π∧∨γ∈Γ γ ∧
∧
γ∈Γ∇{γ,
}. (Derivable from P, G0, G1, and GS5,
and the induction hypothesis)
Replacing φ with χ in ψ gives an equivalent formula with one less -operator.
Thus by induction, all formulae in L(1) can be translated into an equivalent formula
in L(1) using the axiomatisation FELS5(1). 
Lemma 4.9 Every formula of L(1) is provably equivalent to a formula of L(1) with
the axiomatisation FELKD45(1) .
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for Lemma 4.8, with the main diﬀerence
being that the axiom GKD45 is used in place of GS5 in the induction over the
structure of φ.
Speciﬁcally, given some subformula φ, where φ is -free, we can prove by in-
duction on the structure of φ that φ is provably equivalent to a formula χ without
φ.
• (φ ∨ ψ) iﬀ φ ∨ ψ. (Follows from the soundness of P, G0, and G1, and the
induction hypothesis.)
• (π ∧∇Γ) iﬀ π ∧∧γ∈Γ∇{γ,
}. (Follows from the soundness of P, G0, G1, and
GKD45, and the induction hypothesis)
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The rest is as for Lemma 4.8. 
The rest of the completeness proof is merely a formality to show that, given the
above translations into L(1), we can show completeness by using these translations
along with the completeness of LS5(1) and LKD45(1) .
Corollary 4.10 Let φ ∈ L(1) be given and ψ ∈ L(1) be equivalent to φ under the
semantics of LS5(1). If ψ is a theorem in LS5(1), then φ is a theorem in FELS5(1).
Proof. Let φ ∈ L(1) and let ψ ∈ L(1) be semantically equivalent to φ. By
Lemma 4.8, we can obtain some φ′ ∈ L(1) that is semantically equivalent to φ
(and thus also to ψ) by following the given translation steps. We can extend a
derivation of ψ to a derivation of φ′ as the two are semantically equivalent under
LS5(1), and by the completeness of LS5(1) this equivalence is derivable. As FELS5(1) is a
conservative extension of LS5(1), this equivalence is therefore also derivable in FELS5(1).
The derivation can be further extended to φ by observing that all of the reduction
steps in Lemma 4.8 are provable equivalences in FELS5(1). Therefore φ is a theorem
in FELS5(1). 
Lemma 4.11 The axiom schema FELS5(1) is complete for the logic LS5(1).
In the following proof we use a subscript on the turnstile symbol to denote the
logic we are working in (e.g. LS5
(1)
is entailment in LS5(1)).
Proof. Let φ ∈ L(1) such that LS5
(1)
φ. Then by Lemma 4.8, there exists a
semantically equivalent formula ψ ∈ L(1) which is -free. As LS5
(1)
φ and φ ↔ ψ,
then LS5
(1)
ψ. As ψ is -free, then it follows that LS5
(1)
ψ, and by the completeness of
FELS5(1) it follows that LS5(1) ψ. Therefore by Corollary 4.10 we have that LS5(1) φ.
Theorem 4.12 The axiomatisation FELS5(1) is sound and complete for the logic
LS5(1).
Proof. The soundness proof is given in Lemma 4.6 and the completeness proof is
given in Lemma 4.11. 
Theorem 4.13 The axiomatisation FELKD45(1) is sound and complete for the logic
LKD45(1) .
Proof. The soundness proof is given in Lemma 4.7, and we note that similar results
to Corollary 4.10 and Lemma 4.11 can be shown with minor modiﬁcations to their
proofs, which gives us completeness. 
5 Complexity
The proofs of completeness given above allow us to derive a decision procedure for
LS5(1) and LKD45(1) , and thus show that these logics are decidable.
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Theorem 5.1 The logics LS5(1) and LKD45(1) are decidable.
Proof. Given a formula φ in LS5(1), we can ﬁnd an equivalent ψ in LS5(1) (from
Lemma 4.8). We can therefore determine whether ψ is satisﬁable using a decision
procedure designed for LS5(1). The decidability for LS5(1) therefore follows from the
decidability of LS5(1) [4].
The proof for LKD45(1) is the same, but relying on Lemma 4.9 for the translation,
and on the decidability of LKD45(1) [4]. 
In this section we wish to reason about the complexity of the decidability prob-
lem for LS5(1) and LKD45(1) , and speciﬁcally we will present an upper-bound for this
complexity.
It should be noted that the translation described above has a non-elementary
complexity. This comes from the conversion to prenex normal form required for
each -operator. Similar to a disjunctive normal form, this results in an exponential
increase in formula size in the worst-case, and this eﬀect is stacked in the case of
nested -operators, resulting in a non-elementary complexity.
Below we describe a better decision procedure for LS5(1). We ﬁrst show that to
determine the satisﬁability of φ in S5 (1) it is suﬃcient to only check a ﬁnite set of
models, MS5(1), determined by the propositional atoms used in φ.
Lemma 5.2 Let P be a ﬁnite set of propositional atoms. Then there exists a ﬁnite
set MS5(1) of S5 (1) models such that, if φ ∈ L(1) is a formula over the propositional
atoms P then φ is satisﬁable under the semantics of LS5(1) if and only if φ is satisﬁed
by a model in MS5(1)
Proof. Each model in MS5(1) is constructed from a set of states S ∈ P(P(P ))−{∅}.
We note that in S5 (1), the relationship between states is uniquely determined from
the reﬂexive, transitive and symmetric properties of S5 (1). We deﬁne the valuation
at each state to be the set of atoms that represents the state itself.
We ﬁrst note that LS5(1) has the ﬁnite model property, as it is expressively equiv-
alent to LS5(1), which also has this property [4]. This means that a formula of L(1)
is satisﬁable in S5 (1) if and only if it is satisﬁed by a ﬁnite model in S5 (1). Fur-
thermore, we note that every ﬁnite model of S5 (1) is bisimilar to a ﬁnite model in
which the valuations at each state are unique. In particular, as MS5(1) is formed from
every possible combination of valuations over P , any ﬁnite model deﬁned over the
propositions in P is bisimilar to a model in MS5(1).
Then suppose that φ is satisﬁable. Then it is satisﬁed by a ﬁnite model Ms ∈
S5 (1). Without loss of generality we may assume that the only propositions in
Ms are from P . Then Ms is bisimilar to a model in M
S5
(1) which also satisﬁes φ.
Conversely, suppose that φ is not satisﬁable. Then it is not satisﬁed by any ﬁnite
model, and so it is not satisﬁed by any model in MS5(1). 
Given the set MS5(1), we can determine the satisﬁability of a formula over the
propositional atoms in P by iterating over the models in MS5(1) and testing each
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model according to the semantics of LS5(1).
Lemma 5.3 Algorithm 1 reports that a formula φ is satisﬁable if and only if φ is
satisﬁable in LS5(1).
Proof. MS5(1) is ﬁnite and computable, from the description given in the proof of
Lemma 5.2. The partial ordering on MS5(1) can be computed due to Lemma 2.6. The
correctness of the main loop follows from the semantics of LS5(1) and an inductive
argument over the map satisfies. 
Corollary 5.4 Satisﬁability for LS5(1) can be determined in 2EXP time.
Proof. Let φ be a formula of size n. There are at most n distinct propositional
atoms in φ, and so the set of models MS5(1) contains at most 2
2n − 1 models. If
models are represented as sets of states, any two models fromMS5(1) can be tested for
bisimulation in O(2n) time, by testing for set inclusion, and so the partial ordering
on MS5(1) can be determined in O(2
n · (22n − 1)2) time. There are also at most n
subformulae of φ, and an ordering of these under inclusion can be computed in O(n)
time.
The inner loop of Algorithm 1 executes at most n · (22n −1) ·2n times. The cases
for φ ≡ p for p ∈ P , φ ≡ ¬α and φ ≡ α∧β can be computed inO(lg n) time. The case
for φ ≡ α can be computed in O(2n) time. The case for φ ≡ α can be computed
in O(22
n−1) time. Therefore the main loop executes in O(n ·(22n−1) ·2n ·(22n−1))





Require: Let φ be a LS5(1) formula.
Ensure: Return true if and only if φ is satisﬁable.
Construct a partial ordering models on MS5(1), ordered by reﬁnement.
Initialise a map satisfies from formulae to sets of pointed models. Initialise
the values satisfies(ψ) ← ∅ for every subformula ψ of φ.
for all Subformulae ψ of φ, in an order that respects the partial ordering of
subformula inclusion do
for all M ∈ models do
for all s ∈ SM do
Add Ms to satisfies(ψ) if and only if any of the following:
ψ ≡ p for some p ∈ P and p ∈ V M (s)
ψ ≡ ¬α and Ms /∈ satisfies(α)
ψ ≡ α ∧ β and Ms ∈ satisfies(α) and Ms ∈ satisfies(β)
ψ ≡ α and Mt ∈ satisfies(α) for every t ∈ sRM
ψ ≡ α and Nt ∈ satisfies(α) for every Nt ∈ MS5(1) such that Nt  Ms
if satisfies(φ) = ∅ then return true else return false
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We can deﬁne a set similar to MS5(1) for KD45 (1) models, called M
KD45
(1) . Each
model in MKD45(1) is constructed from a set of states S ∈ P(P(P ))−{∅}, along with
an optional state s ∈ S, designated as the only non-reﬂexive state in the model.
We note that in KD45 (1), the relationship between states is uniquely determined by
which states are reﬂexive, along with the serial, transitive and Euclidean properties
of KD45 (1). We can then show a similar result to Lemma 5.2, and extend Algo-
rithm 1 to LKD45(1) by replacing the set MS5(1) with MKD45(1) . The resulting algorithm
also runs in 2EXP time.
6 Future work
Left for future work are the generalisation of the axiomatisations to the multi-agent
logics LS5 and LKD45 , and the consideration of the decidability problems in these
logics.
The generalisation for the axioms of LK(1) to the multi-agent logic LK involves
generalising the GK axiom, and adding extra axioms to handle the interaction
between diﬀerent agents. Whilst a similar approach does not seem to work for the
multi-agent LS5 , it seems possible for LKD45 .
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